Congressional Committees - Contempt Powers by Friedland, Irvin J.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 43
Issue 3 Winter 1960 Article 6
Congressional Committees - Contempt Powers
Irvin J. Friedland
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation





Two relatively recent cases decided by the Supreme Court have
attempted to lay down rules which will safeguard witnesses brought
before Congressional Committees. The more recent of the two cases,
Barenblatt v. United States,' required an interpretation of the rules
laid down in the earlier one, Watkins v. United States.2 This article
will attempt to show that the Barenblatt case did not follow the prin-
ciples set down in the Watkins decision. As it did not specifically
overrule Watkins it is submitted that it leaves the state of the law in
the area of contempt powers of Congressional Committees more con-
fused than ever.
Even if the Barenblatt decision had been consistent with the Wat-
kins case, the main problems of witnesses appearing before the Com-
mittees would not be solved. Therefore, after comparing the factual
situation of the Barenblatt case with the rules set down in Watkins,
this author will give his opinion as to what those problems are, and a
possible solution to them.
II. FAcTs OF BARENBLATT CASE
On June 4, 1954, Lloyd Barenblatt was served with a subpoena to
appear before the House Subcommittee on Un-American Activities.3
He appeared before the Committee on June 28, 1954, being the last of'
five witnesses who testified that day.
The first witness to testify that day was Francis Crowley. Crowley
was appearing voluntarily as he now had a desire to tell his entire
story which he had refused to tell the Committee when he was called
before them previously. Crowley stated that he had attended the
University of Michigan from 1947-1950, and during ths time he was
a member of the Communist Party. He named many individuals at
the University of Michigan whom he believed to be Communists or
associated with similar groups. One of the groups he mentioned was
the Haldane Club which he described as being "chiefly of an intellec-
tual nature discussing things."14 It consisted of 8 or 10 instructors.
Among those Crowley named were Robert Silk, Norman Cayden,
Lloyd Barenblatt, and Lester Beberfall.5 Crowley identified Baren-
blatt as a member of the Haldane Club and the Communist Party, but
added that Barenblatt was no longer a member.6
lBarenblatt v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. .1081 (1959).2 Watldns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
a The Subcommittee hereinafter will be referred to as the Committee.
- Record, p. 204, Barenblatt v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. .1081 (1959).
5 Record, p. 210-211.
6 Record, p. 210.
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Barenblatt, an instructor at Vassar College, supplied the Committee
with information on his educational background, but when he was
asked about being a member of the Communist Party at Michigan he
indicated he wished to object to the question. The Chairman then told
him to answer the question before objecting.7 The question then pro-
pounded followed: "Are you now a member of the Communist Party ?"
Barenblatt asked to read his objections, and after some discussion they
were admitted into evidence, but not read aloud.
Subsequently, four further questions were asked of Barenblatt,9
which he refused to answer on the basis of the objections already
admitted into evidence. The Committee then mentioned their duty
under their authorizing resolution to concern themselves with "several
active bills dealing" with subversive activities, but never stated any
further details as to what these bills dealt with.10 The Committee then
excused Barenblatt and adjourned. On July 23, 1954, he was cited for
contempt by the House of Representatives."
III. PERTINENCY OF THE QUESTIONS UNDER INQUIRY
Barenblatt was tried for contempt of Congress, convicted, and sen-
tenced under 2 U.S.C. 192 (1952) which states, inter alia, that it is a
crime to appear before a congressional committee and refuse to "an-
swer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry." Prior de-
cisions had interpreted rights of defendants under 192. When Con-
gress, by this statute, seeks to enforce its power through the criminal
process administered by the federal judiciary the defendant has the
same rights that are secured by the Courts to defendants in other
criminal actions.12 One of these rights is to know, in advance, with
sufficient clarity that he may be violating a criminal statute. 3 To know
in advance if he is violating 192 the witness must be able to determine
if the questions are "pertinent to the question under inquiry." Perti-
nency becomes one of the elements of the crime and must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The need for a clear understanding of
what is under inquiry becomes all the more necessary because the
7 Record, p. 222.
s Record, p. 227.
9 The questions were:
"Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?"
"Now you have said that you knew Francis Crowley. Did you know Fran-
cis Crowley as a member of the Communist Party?"
"Were you ever a member of the Haldane Club of the Communist Party
while at the University of Michigan ?"
"Were you a member while a student of the University of Michigan Coun-
cil of Arts, Sciences and Professions?"
10 Record, p. 240.
11 Record, p. 69.
12 Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958).
13 United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952) ; United States v. Cohen Gro-
cery Co. 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
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witness is not exonerated by a good faith error on his determination
of the pertinency of the question.
The Watkins case laid down the duty of the Committee to speci-
fically tell the witness the purpose of his being questioned.' 4 The
Barenblatt decision does not deny this but feels, under the facts, that
the witness was so informed.15
It seems to this author, that the factual conclusions made in Baren-
blatt can be challenged. The majority opinion of the Supreme Court
mentions Barenblatt's failure to raise the objection of pertinency when
he appeared before the Committee."e If the Court" is suggesting that
he thereby waived the objection, the answer is that it cannot be waived.
... the right to refuse to answer a question which is not perti-
nent is not a personal privilege, such as the right to refrain
from self-incrimination, which is waived if not reasonably as-
serted.18
Or the Court may mean that because Barenblatt did not raise the issue
of pertinency before the Committee, he was in no doubt concerning
the question under inquiry. Both viewpoints seem unreasonable.
Barenblatt objected to the jurisdiction of the Committee and the
deprivation of his constitutional rights. If he was correct, there was no
need to make further objections as the ones already made were suffi-
cient. He did not object to the pertinency of the questions as he felt
the Committee had no power to ask him any questions regardless of
the pertinency.
The opinion in Watkins clearly describes five criteria by which the
pertinence of a question can be made clear to a witness: (1) the
authorizing resolution, (2) the opening remarks of the chairman,
members, or counsel of the Committees, (3) the nature of the proceed-
ings, (4) the questions themselves, and (5) the chairman's response
to an objection on pertinency. 19
The first yardstick the witness may use to determine the "question
under inquiry" is to scrutinize the authorizing resolution of the
Committee. This reveals this verbage:
The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by
subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investi-
gations of (1) the extent, character, and objects of Un-Ameri-
can propaganda activities in the United States, (2) the diffusion
14 Watkins v. United States, supra, note 2 at 214.
15 Barenblatt v. United States, supra, note 1 at 1091, 1092.
'1 Ibid.
17 The Supreme Court will hereinafter be referred to as the Court.
18 Bowers v. United States, 202 F. 2d 477, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Accord. Chris-
toffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
'19 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, at 180-209 (1957).
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within the United States of subversive and un-American propa-
ganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic
origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as
guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3) all other questions in
relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary reme-
dial legislation.20
One need only read the authorizing resolution to see how uncertain a
course it charts for the Committee. It is so vague that the Government
in Watkins conceded that it could be of no help in determining the
pertinency of questions asked of a witness.21 Any possibility that the
resolution could serve in this case as a guide to pertinency of questions
was disposed of by the comment of the Court that, "It would be diffi-
cult to imagine a less explicit authorizing resolution. 2 -
Another means by which the pertinency of questions can be dis-
closed is the nature of the proceedings. All the witnesses who appeared
prior to Barenblatt had at one time been at the University of Michigan,
and had the questions been confined to the University and to education
the subject under inquiry might have been clear. Instead, this connec-
tion with the University of Michigan was used as an initial jumping
off point to probe into their service records, their attitudes and beliefs
regarding the Committee, their non-subversive political associations,
and other activities. 23 From the maze of topics covered in the proceed-
ings, Barenblatt could only guess as to the pertinency of questions that
might be put to him. The nature of the proceedings did not avoid this
"vice of vagueness. '
"24
Another source of evidence as to the "question under inquiry" is
the questions themselves. Barenblatt refused to answer five questions.2"
Surely the first few questions asking him if he was or is now a Com-
munist, would be of little help in discovering what subject the Commit-
tee was investigating. If Barenblatt had to use the rest of the questions
themselves as a guide, he would be put in the position of having to
ascertain the nature of the inquiry from a hurried deduction of what he
believes to be the purpose of the questions. To make such a demand
of the witness seems contrary to the rationale upon which Watkins is
based. The affirmative obligation is on the Committee to clarify the
nature of the inquiry. It is not on the witness.
A further standard the Court looks to is the Chairman's response
when the witness objects on the ground of pertinency. The Supreme
20 H.R. Res. No. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 Cong. Rec. 15, 18, (1953).
21 Watkins v. United States, siupra, note 19, at 209.
22d. at 202.
23 Hearings Before the Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Repre-
sentatives, June 28 and 29, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 5755-5801 (1954).
24 United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 1947).
22 See footnote 9.
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Court points out that Barenblatt did not pose an objection on the
grounds of pertinency.26 Any such objection before this Committee
would probably not have elicited any clarification of the nature of the
inquiry. This becomes apparent when it is noted that at first the
Committee refused to listen to Barenblatt's objections.27 The Commit-
tee then used the rather unorthodox procedure of demanding an an-
swer before hearing the objection. Little was to be gained by having
pertinency explained after he answered .2  Finally the Committee ad-
mitted Barenblatt's objections into evidence,29 but every time he used
the objections as grounds for refusing to answer, the Chairman ordered
him to answer despite the fact that he had no knowledge of what the
objections contained.3 0 Barenblatt's lack of objecting on the grounds
of pertinency under these circumstances cannot lead to the conclusion
that he was in no doubt as to the question under inquiry.
The last standard the Court looks to is the opening remarks of the
Chairman or Counsel. The Court, in the Barenblatt case, felt that the
opening remarks were sufficient to disclose the "question under in-
quiry."'" The opening remarks were more illuminating than any of
the other four criteria,3 2 but the decision presumes that this background
knowledge was heard by Barenblatt, without any showing that such
was the case. No "presumption of pertinency" will suffice, 33 and it
must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt. '34 Therefore it would
seem that the opening remarks should either be heard personally or
repeated to the witness before he can be held liable for their content.
IV. THE AUTHORIZING RESOLUTION OF THE HouSE COMMITTEE ON
UN-AMERICAN AcTIVITIES
The Watkins decision, in addition to setting the standards of perti-
nency seemed to invalidate the authorizing resolution of the Commit-
tee. The resolution was found to be so vague that it was impossible
to determine what subjects were within the scope of the Committee's
jurisdiction, and therefore the Committee could never be acting within
its proper limits.
It is well settled that compulsory process cannot be used to convict
witnesses for refusing to answer questions which Congress has not
26 Barenblatt v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 1081, at 1091 (1959).
27 Record, p. 223.
28 "Mr. Barenblatt. But, sir, I believe I have a right to state my objections to
the question. That is all I am doing."
"Mr. Velde. You will be given that right if you will answer the question in
the affirmative or the negative." Record, p. 223.
29 Record, p. 227.
so Record. p. 238.
31 Barenblatt v. United States, supra, note 26 at 1092.
32 For opening remarks, see: Id. at 1095.
33 Bowers v. United States, 202 F. 2d 447, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
34 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165 (1955).
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given the Committee authority to ask5.3  This proposition was accepted
and reiterated in Watkins in the statement that "these committees are
restricted to the missions delegated to them . . ." and that "no witness
can be compelled to make disclosures on matters outside that area."3
The only source for the Committee's jurisdiction that has been dele-
gated to it by Congress is its authorizing resolution.
In trying to assess the jurisdiction of this Committee from its
authorization the Court has said:
Combining the language of the resolution with the construction
it has been given, it is evident that the preliminary control of the
Committee exercised by the House of Representatives is slight
or non-existent. No one could reasonably deduct from the
charter the kind of investigation that the Committee was di-
rected to make.37 (Emphasis added.)
The Court went on to declare that the Committee was allowed to
"define its own authority," and it almost had to be this way as of
necessity because the jurisdictional boundaries set by the House of
Representatives were so "nebulous." s The Court indicated that the),
found it impossible to judge what the resolution was aimed at as the
original draftsmen had never made this judgment. 39 From the imme-
diately preceding philosophy it appeared settled that the authorizing
resolution of the House Committee on Un-American Activities is so
uncertain as to make impossible any determination of Committee juris-
diction. 41
Since no one can be compelled to testify outside the delegated area,
and the delegated area of this Committee is unascertainable, it seemed
to follow that the Government can never carry the burden of proof in
showing that any subject was delegated to this Committee.41
These conclusions are disturbed by the majority opinion in Baren-
blatt that there were two reasons that militated against interpreting
Watkins as striking down the Committee's authorizing resolution. It
was asserted that: (1) if the Supreme Court had held this they would
have used more specific language; (2) if they had done this there
would have been no further discussion.
.5 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; United States v. Orman, 207 F.
2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953); United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791, 804 (D.C.
Mass. 1956).
3 Watkins v. United States, supra, note 19 at 206.
Id. at 203, 204.
's Id. at 205.
9 Id. at 206.
40 The scope of the delegated power in the charter must be even more clearly
revealed when First Amendment rights are threatened. United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
41 "The burden of proof" in showing if the Subcommittee was authorized to
conduct this particular inquiry "is in the government." United States v.
Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791, 792 (D.C. Mass. 1956).
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The argument that the Supreme Court would have used more speci-
fic language if they desired such a result, does not seem consistent in
light of the strong language used in Watkins. The conclusion reached
in Watkins would seem to be more than explicit as illustrated by the
quotations from Watkins set out earlier in this article. The dissenters
in the Barenblatt case found the Watkins language explicit enough to
compel interpreting the decision as striking down the authorizing
resolution:
Measured by the foregoing standards, Rule XI cannot support
any conviction for refusal to testify .... I think it clear that the
boundaries of the Committee are, to say the least, 'nebulous'
indeed, 'it would be difficult to imagine a less explicit authoriz-
ing resolution.' 42
The majority's belief that if the authorizing resolution had been
struck down there would have been no need for the pertinency discus-
sion seems to have ignored a familiar rule: "Where there are two
grounds, upon either of which an appellate court may rest its decision,
and it adopts both, 'the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the
judgment of the court and of equal validity with the other.' -43 It has
been suggested that the vagueness of the authorizing resolution could
be cured by a statement from the Committee Chairman defining the
delegated area of the Committee's jurisdiction. Perhaps, if this was
done, it would fill in the gaps left open by the authorizing resolution.
It would also save Congress from the difficult task of making the reso-
lution specific and still giving the Committee enough latitude to probe
into new problems as they arose.
V. RIGHTS UNDER THE FIRST AiENDMENT
The Committee, by attempting to compel Barenblatt to discuss his
political associations and activities, has raised a fundamental question
regarding the protection afforded by the First Amendment to the highly
sensitive area of academic freedom. Barenblatt properly raised this
objection before the Committee when he stated in his objections that,
"under the First Amendment to the Constitution the power of investi-
gation by Congress in matters invading freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press is limited." 44 And in view of this, "any investigations
into my writings or speech communications is beyond the power of
this Committee." 45
There is no doubt that the First Amendment does apply to investi-
gations:
42 Barenblatt v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 1081, at 1099 (dissent) (1959).
43 United States v. Title Ins. & Tire, 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924). Accord, Union
Pacific R.R. v. Mason Cty, 199 U.S. 160, 166 (1905).
44 Record, p. 229-230.
45 Record, p. 230.
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Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command that the
Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or
press or assembly. While it is true that there is no statute to be
reviewed, and that an investigation is not a law, nevertheless an
investigation is part of lawmaking.4
Since it is clear that a witness appearing before a committee has some
safeguards derived from the First Amendment, it is essential that he
should have some guide as to what they are. He must decide when he
appears before a committee if he can justifiably invoke such a protec-
tion. If he is in error a criminal conviction is the result.
A "balancing test" was laid down by the Court for individual ques-
tions asked of witnesses:
Where First Amendments rights are asserted to bar govern-
mental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a
balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.4 7
This test seems rather difficult to apply by a witness on the stand to
whom a question has just been propounded.4" But, if the purpose of
the question has been fully disclosed, it would be possible to apply this
test, and it would be very difficult to devise a more objective standard
without unduly burdening the Committee.
While the "balancing test" sets the standard for individual ques-
tions asked of witnesses there remains the more fundamental question
of what test is to be used in limiting committee's powers to investigate
subjects which might infringe upon First Amendment rights. This
question remains open as neither the Barenblatt or Watkins case dealt
specifically with it, nor has any other case definitely answered the
question.
49
Some would narrow the area test to such a degree that if any infor-
mation gathered by the investigation could conceivably result in valid
legislation then the investigation is not prohibited. The trouble with
this argument is it proves too much. Always some information gained
would be of some relevance to potential legislation. This argument is
drawn to its logical conclusion by permitting any First Amendment
area to be invaded on the pretext that the resulting legislation contem-
plated by the Committee was a constitutional amendment. 50 To con-
strue the area test in such a manner is to do away with it.
46 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, at 197 (1957).
47 Barenblatt v. United States, supra, note 42 at 1093.
48 Id. at 1010, 1011 (dissenting opinion).
49 The only decision where a congressional committee has been found to have
abridged First Amendment rights is Rumely v. United States, 197 F. 2d 16
(D.C. Cir. 1952), Aff'd on other grounds, 345 U.S. 494, 501-502.
50 An Australian case rejected just such a theory. Attorney General for the




Another generally applied standard in this area is the test of clear
and present danger. The often quoted statement of this test is that
Congress would have the right to investigate conduct "of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that it will bring about substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." 51 While the "clear and
present danger" test would certainly guarantee the upholding of First
Amendment rights, it has been urged that it should not be used for
investigations as it would be impractical to wait for a dear and present
danger before starting to investigate. 52
The Barsky case suggests a standard of "reasonable cause for
concern.1 53 This test, as opposed to the standard allowing investigation
into any area which could conceivably result in legislation, seems to
prohibit committees from unnecessarily infringing on First Amend-
ment rights. Neither would it be too restrictive on topics of investiga-
tion as would the "clear and present danger" test. The problem remains
as to how the Committee is to inform itself as to when a "reasonable
cause for concern" exists. The Committee should not go to the wit-
nesses in the first instance. It would probably result in a "fishing
expedition" if committees could question witnesses merely to discover
if there were a "reasonable cause for concern." The problem of
determining when a "cause for concern" exists can be dealt with in
another way. In Barsky the dissent stated:
The answer is through the Department of Justice, whose duty
it is, if clear and present danger can be discovered, to enforce
the law of 1940 which makes it a crime to advocate overthrow
of the government by force; through any new agency that Con-
gress may think it useful to create.5
4
VI. PROBLEM AND SOLUTION
This writer feels that the Court would have been more logical if it
had stayed with the Watkins philosophy. Even the Watkins decision,
however, does not seem to be the answer to the problems of witnesses
appearing before Congressional Committees. The House of Repre-
sentatives could amend the authorizing resolution so as to make it
more specific. And the members of the Committees, by making sure
the individual witnesses were present when they disclose the purpose
of the questions to be asked, could overcome the pertinency objection.
The scope of the First Amendment objection needs to be clarified, but
few would say it applied where Congress was investigating the advo-
51 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
52 Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
531d. at 246. See also United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82, 90, 91 (2d Cir.
1947), suggesting something less than a clear and present'danger test.
54 Id. at 259 (dissenting opinion). -.
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cacy of the violent overthrow of our government, even in the delicate
area of education.
An objection by the witness for any of the above grounds would
not solve his central problem, public exposure. Even if successful,
such objections would only result in the silence of the witness. And
silence by a witness, in the public's eye, is not much better than an
admission of guilt.', Often times the punishment imposed by the force
of public opinion is as great as any court could inflict.5 6
It is this author's opinion that the best safeguard for a sincere
witness is to allow him to make a statement in which he could explain
any answers which might tend to incriminate him in the public's eye.
The witness could then show the motives and surrounding circum-
stances of any associations or group memberships, and possibly explain,
to the satisfaction of the public, his real innocence in these matters. If
a witness is forced to give simple "yes" or "no" answers, the inferences
which might be drawn by the public could be very unfair to him;
whereas, if he could explain further, the answer might not seem nearly
so incriminating.
To allow the safeguard suggested above would not "hamstring" the
Committee as would many of the other suggested procedural reforms.
5 7
Several bills have been introduced in Congress which would require
committees to allow witnesses to explain any answers given by them.
They were not passed because of other detailed courtroom procedural
55"... the chief aim, purpose, and practice of the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee, as disclosed by its many reports, is to try witnesses and pun-
ish them because they are or have been Communists or because they refuse
to admit or deny Communist affiliations. The punishment by humilation and
public shame .. " Barenblatt v. United States, supra, note 42 at 1107 (dis-
senting opinion).
"Indeed, in the court of public opinion, the only court setting, the invocation
of the Fifth Amendment, by the witnesses in such inquiries has in most cases,
despite labored demonstrations that it ought not be so, been regarded as an
admission of guilt, so the practical result of the invocation of the privilege
had been negligible." Mayers, Shall We Amend The Fifth Amendment, at 132
(1959).
56 "While the American people were fortunate to have this testimony, some of
the witnesses themselves were not. Instances have come to the Committees
attention where several of these witnesses have been forced from gainful
employment after testifying. Some have been released from employment
which they competently held for years prior to their testimony." H.R. Rep.
No. 2516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 3.
Also see: United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
57 In 1949, a bill was introduced in Congress which allows witnesses in Congres-
sional Committees, among other rights to: 1) file a sworn statement for the
record, 2) testify personally in his own behalf, 3) require the Committee to
produce up to 4 witnesses on his behalf, 4) examine such witnesses either by
counsel or personally, 5) require the Committee to procure the appearance
of adverse witnesses, and 6) cross examine adverse witnesses, either person-
ally or by counsel. S. Cong. Res. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 95th Cong. Rec. 51
(Jan. 5, 1949).
Such extensive safeguards for witnesses would cause, not only the expo-




safeguards contained in them.58 A legislative committee is not a court
and cannot effectively discharge its investigative and policy-making
duties operating as a court, with pleadings, motions, and rules of evi-
dence. But merely to allow the witness to make a complete statement
would not seem to unduly burden the committees. Perhaps, if such a
safeguard were made a part of the committee's procedure, such cases
as Barenblatt and Watkins might never reach the courts.
lIvrN j. FREEDLAND
58 Footnote 57. Also see: H.R. 4564, 80th Cong., 1st S ess., (Nov. 24, 1947).
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